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WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF 
A RECENT TAX REFORM IN MEXICO 
Carlos M. Urzúa* 
El Colegio de México 
Resumen: El trabajo evalúa dos recientes reformas a los impuestos indirectos en 
México realizadas en 1995 y 1998, centrando la atención sobre su im-
pacto en el bienestar social y el de los hogares. El análisis empírico se 
basa en la estimación del llamado sistema casi ideal de demanda, en su 
correcta versión no-lineal, y mediante el empleo del método generaliza-
do de momentos. 
Abstract: This paper evaluates the indirect tax reforms that took place in Mexico 
in 1995 and 1998, focusing on their impact on welfare at the household 
and social levels. The empirical analysis is based on the estimation of an 
Almost Ideal Demand system, using its correct nonlinear version and by 
means of the generalized method of moments. 
1. Introduction 
This paper assesses the impact of two indirect-tax reforms that took place 
in Mexico in 1995 and 1998. The empirical analysis is based on the estima-
tion of a complete demand system using the 1994 income and expenditure 
survey ENIGH, an acronym for Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los 
Hogares published by the National Statistics an Geography Institute 
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(INEGI, 1996). As such, this paper follows the empirical analyses presented 
in King (1983) the pioneer paper, as well as in Baccouche and Laisney 
(1990), Kaiser and Spahn (1989), Labeaga and Lopez (1996), and Patrizi, 
Rizzi and Rossi (1991), for, respectively, the English, French, German, Spa-
nish and Italian economies. 
The demand model used in this paper is the Almost Ideal Demand (AID) 
system of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), in its original nonlinear version (the 
only one that should be used for our purposes, as we will try to argue below). 
The fact that the model is a fully nonlinear demand system, and that expen-
ditures can be zero for some goods, raises, in turn, some interesting econo-
metric issues. These are also discussed in the paper. In particular, some argu-
ments are given as to why the generalized method of moments (GMM) is the 
preferred method of estimation for nonlinear demand systems. 
After estimating the model, the impact of the tax reforms at the house-
hold level is assessed using the equivalent variation function. Furthermore, 
an appraisal of the reforms in terms of social welfare is also provided using 
Atkinson's approach (1970). It should be stressed that an implicit assump-
tion in these welfare assessments is that changes in the indirect taxes are 
fully passed on from the firms to the consumers; that is, we will implicitly 
assume that there is no monopoly power in the production sector. Although 
clearly unrealistic, that simplification can be somewhat justified in the case 
of small open economies. Also note that, due to the lack of data, the paper 
does not consider any changes in government transfers that may have taken 
place after the tax reform. 
The content of the paper is as follows: The next section presents infor-
mation on the cross-sectional data set to be used, as well as on the most re-
cent changes in the Mexican indirect-tax system. Section 3 introduces the 
demand system, warns about some possible errors in its specification, re-
views the problem that arises in the case of zero expenditures, suggests the 
use of GMM as the most appropriate estimation method, and presents the es-
timated system. Using the results thus obtained, section 4 assesses the 
welfare consequences of the tax reforms. Finally, section 5 concludes sug-
gesting some directions for future research. 
2. The data set 
Our study is based on the income and expenditure survey of 12,815 Mexi-
can households made by the government in 1994 (INEGI, 1996). Our actual TAX REFORM IN MEXICO  59 
sample size is 12,696, since not all households reported expenditures on 
the goods to be considered here.
1 Note that the survey was taken a few 
months before the economic crisis that started at the end of that year. This 
is one of the reasons for not using a more recent survey, taken in 1996, 
since in 1966 most households were still recovering from a pronounced 
recession that lasted five quarters (an economic depression in technical 
terms). But there is still a more important reason for using the older sur-
vey: in what follows, we treat the indirect tax reforms that took place in 
1995 and 1998 as a single reform, and so we need observations prior to 
both tax changes. 
The structure of ENIGH is quite standard. It includes several socio-de-
mographic variables, together with an assessment of net monthly income 
(including non-monetary income). On the expenditure side, the survey co-
vers all non-durable goods, many durables, auto-consumption of non-dura-
bles (consumption of goods that were household-produced), and some 
financial transactions. Out of all those observations, we consider here the 
data set described in table 1. 
As can be appreciated from that table, we aggregate a large number of 
consumption goods to obtain just four composite goods. Two main reasons 
can be given to justify that aggregation procedure. First, since we want to 
consider the possibility, hitherto unexplored in the literature as far as we 
know, of estimating the full nonlinear system by GMM, it is very important 
to keep the dimensions of the problem as small as possible. The second re-
ason is that our aggregation procedure is consistent with the differential 
treatment accorded by Mexican tax laws to both the value added tax (VAT) 
and excise taxes at the federal level.
2 
More explicitly, the indirect tax reform that we analyze here began to 
take place in 1995, when the federal government decided to increase the 
general VAT rate from 10% to 15%. The reason behind that policy was 
simply the need to raise more revenue during the economic crisis that 
began at the end of 1994. Given the success of this measure in increasing 
revenue, in 1998 the government attempted to levy the general VAT rate on 
consumption goods that were, and still are, taxed at a zero rate (mostly 
1 We also eliminated all the reported expenditures for which there was no quoted price. 
Finally, we also discarded a household, with folio number 42270100, that did report expendi-
tures, albeit somewhat randomly, but no income. 
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goods that are considered to be primary necessities). However, after a blo-
ody political fight among the representatives of the main party and the op-
position parties, the authorities decided to increase instead several excise 
rates. As a summary of all those changes, table 1 also includes information 
about the tax rates before and after the reform. 
Several more comments are in order to justify the choice of aggregate 
consumption goods made in that table. To start with, the lack of price infor-
mation in the case of most durables and services made us discard them in 
our study. Thus, we will implicitly assume in what follows that the margi-
nal rate of substitution among the goods considered in the study is indepen-
dent of the consumption of durables and semi-durables. 
Furthermore, because of the static nature of the model used here, we 
also excluded savings and all other financial transactions, as well as the 
goods that were not bought in a market. Although auto-consumption could 
be in principle an important component in the consumption pattern of rural 
income groups in particular (and this is only a hypothesis to be explored in 
the future), traditional demand models, such as the one that we are using 
here, cannot, for obvious reasons, accommodate this behavior. 
As a final comment, before closing this section, note that all demand 
systems should be enriched in principle by the inclusion of socio-demo-
graphic variables. These are obviously important, especially in studies that 
are based on the consumption patterns of households rather than of indivi-
duals. In particular, the size of each household, the number of children and 
the level of education of each member may turn out to be relevant factors 
in explaining consumption patterns. In fact, Heien, Jarvis and Perali (1989) 
and Urzûa (1994) have already documented the importance of using key 
socio-demographic variables to explain consumption patterns in Mexico. 
In our case, however, the need to keep the number of parameters as small 
as possible, due to the estimation reasons given before, forced us to keep 
those variables out of our model. 
3. The econometric model and some estimation issues 
We turn now to the specification of the demand model to be used here, the 
nonlinear AID system. Given its popularity, and its reasonable properties, 
there is no need to defend its use in this paper (but see the final section). 
For each household h (= \,...,H), assume that the budget share spent on the 
composite good / (= 1,...,«), denoted by w„ is of the form 62 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
w< = a, +1 7y log pj + Pi \og(y/P) + e, (1) 
where /?, is the price of good j, y is total expenditures on the composite 
goods, the logs are natural logarithms, and P is a price level index given by 
n n n 
log P=cc0 ak \ogPk + 12 £ Xt/ logft logpy. (2) 
Note that the model given in (l)-(2) is a bona fide demand system provided 
that the following restrictions on the parameters are fulfilled: 
£ «/=!. I A=0, I ytf=0, (3) 
/=1 ;=1 /=! 
£ ^=0 (4) 
JirYj' (
5) 
The restrictions in (3) are needed to satisfy adding-up, since the budget 
shares given in (1) have to add to one. Equation (4) is required to ensure 
homogeneity in each demand function. Finally, (5) is needed to assure 
symmetry in the corresponding Slutsky matrix. This last condition, it 
should be observed, involves restrictions across the system, and hence can-
not be implemented, at least in a natural way, if the estimation method is a 
single-equation technique (which, in any case, would be inefficient). 
Other remarks about the model are worth making at this point. To start 
with, the model described in equations (l)-(5) implies that prices vary 
across households. Although several studies similar to ours tend to use the 
simpler linear expenditure system with no variation in prices, such simpli-
fication does not seem to be justified when, as is usually the case, the data 
on goods is aggregated. This is because the implied price for each composi-
te good does not have to be the same across households, unless the compo-
sition of expenditures is exactly the same.
3 
3 In this paper, the implied prices were constructed as the geometric mean of the prices 
involved, using as weights the relative expenditures. TAX REFORM IN MEXICO  63 
It should also be noted that, in most of the applied literature that makes 
use of the AID model, the price index P defined in (2) is usually replaced by 
a simplified price level that does not contain any parameters. By doing that, 
one can circumvent the need for a nonlinear estimation of the full system. 
To that end, most applied researchers, following a suggestion already made 
by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), use Stone's price index: 
n 
logP = £ W,l0g/>, 
The simplicity of the resulting linear model comes, however, at a great 
cost. To start with, the restrictions stated in (3), (4) and (5), do not make the 
corresponding linear model theoretically consistent (see, e.g., Chen, 1998). 
Furthermore, as shown by Buse (1994), not only would the standard SUR 
estimators of the parameters in the linear case be inconsistent, but also con-
sistent instrumental variable estimators can not ever be constructed. Fi-
nally, we add here that since all subsequent welfare exercises have to be 
based on the indirect utility functions underlying the original model, the 
use of such an approximation would certainly bias the final results. 
Leaving for a moment the issue of the demand system to be used, there 
is still another problem that must be faced in studies such as ours; namely, 
the fact that some households could have zero expenditures for some 
goods. Several reasons could justify this behavior: non-interior solutions 
for the underlying utility maximization problem, infrequency of purchase, 
which is exacerbated by the fact that most surveys cover a very short pe-
riod of time, or, finally, the no participation altogether of some households 
in the consumption of some goods. To give an idea of the magnitude of the 
problem in our case, table 2 presents the percentage of non-zero expenditu-
res among the composite goods considered in this study. As can be obser-
ved, these percentages are not as high as we would like them to be. In 
particular, in the case of tobacco and alcoholic beverages the percentage of 
non-zero expenditures seems, a priori, too low (this finding suggests that 
the expenditures on some goods are underestimated by the survey). 
Many different techniques have been suggested in the literature to deal 
with the zero-expenditure problem. The incorrect solutions range from the 
plainly wrong procedure of dropping the observations for which there are 
zero expenditures (which would induce a sample selection bias), to the arti-
ficial device of continuing to aggregate goods until the problem disappears. 64  ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Percentage of households making non zero expenditures 
Key  Composite goods  Percentage 
Cereals, vegetables, fruits, non-processed meat, 
dairy products, eggs and fats 
97.0 
w2  Processed food, clothing, footwear and appliances  96.2 
W3  Beer, other alcoholic beverages and tobacco  16.8 
w4  Medicines  55.2 
The more sensible approaches vary according to the presumed source 
of such zeros. In particular, if they arise because of corner solutions rather 
than of infrequency of purchase or misreporting, it is natural to use stan-
dard tobit analysis. Jarque (1987) and Urzua (1994) provide examples of 
the use of that technique in the case of the Mexican economy. There are, 
however, two problems with that approach: First, the few studies that exa-
mine at the data level the zero expenditure problem typically report that the 
most common explanation for that behavior is infrequency of purchase, rat-
her than corner solutions (see, for instance, Labeaga and Lopez, 1996). But 
the second problem is almost as important: the tobit method is quite cum-
bersome to apply in the case of nonlinear and full demand systems. Fortu-
nately, if the reason for a zero expenditure is infrequency of purchase, 
Keen (1986) has suggested a simple way to evade the problem. Noting that 
consistency can be assured by choosing an appropriate instrument for total 
expenditures, Keen suggests using the true income reported by each house-
hold. We follow here that suggestion.
4 
The third and final issue that we have to face before estimating the 
nonlinear model revolves around the most efficient way to accomplish just 
that. Among the available estimation methods for our full demand system, 
4 Although, as noted by an anonymous referee, the causes for zero expenditures on 
tobacco may be non consumption instead of infrequency of purchase. Note, however, that the 
corresponding composite good also includes alcoholic beverages, so that, unless we separate 
the two categories of goods, it would not be easy to determine the main reason for zero expen-
ditures. TAX REFORM IN MEXICO  65 
method of moments. Regarding the first, its assumption of homoskedasti-
city of the residuals in each equation is unduly restrictive. On the other 
hand, the method of maximum likelihood imposes the assumption of multi-
variate normality (or small departures from it) on the errors, another unte-
nable hypothesis for cross-sectional data such as ours.
6 Thus, the GMM 
estimation method seems to be the most sensible choice (see also the force-
ful arguments in Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Surprisingly enough, 
aside from this work, there does not seem to be any other instance of appl-
ying GMM to estimate the full, nonlinear AID system. 
Taking into consideration all the remarks given above, we now proce-
ed to estimate the model described by equations (1) to (5). Given the large 
dimensionality of the unrestricted demand system, we decided to impose 
from the beginning restrictions (3)-(5). Thus, by the first condition in (3), 
we can drop one of the behavioral equations in the system. It should be 
noted, however, that in this demand system, as in all others, the final esti-
since the tax increases that took place during the reform did not affect these 
items. Making use now of all the restrictions of the demand system, there 
are only thirteen parameters left to estimate. This is so because all the coef-
ficients for / = 4 in equation (1) are implied by (3)-(4), and also the value of 
three other gammas is implied by (5). 
On the other hand, there are fifteen moment conditions to be fulfilled 
by the corresponding GMM estimators:
7 
5 Given the need for using an instrument for total expenditures, the SUR estimation met-
hod cannot be used here. 
6 In a preliminary examination of the data, not reported here, the ALM test for multivaria-
te normality (Urzua, 1997) was used for each of the budget shares. In all cases, the hypothesis 
of normality was overwhelmingly rejected. 
7 Note that, as was recommended before, we do not impose any constraints on the se-
cond moments of the residuals. 
of medicines (i = 4), 
i= 1,2,3, 66 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
where y* is reported income (following Keen, 1986), and 
£. = Wl-a,~i Yulog/}-Pilog(y/P) i= 1, 2, 3, (6) 
7=1 
where the coefficients in (6) can be expressed, using (3) to (5), only in 
terms of the thirteen parameters to be estimated. 
The problem given above was solved using the GMM subroutine writ-
ten in GAUSS by Roncalli (1996), which in turn, uses White's variance-co-
variance matrix as its weighting matrix.
8 Although the numerical GMM 
procedure was quite slow in our case, it seems to have been robust (several 
trials with different initial conditions lead to the same outcome). The re-
sults were satisfactory: eleven coefficients were highly significant, and the 
statistics value for Hansen's test of over identifying restrictions was around 
274 (with a P-value of less than 10"
5). 
Although the coefficients are not informative by themselves, the co-
rresponding elasticities can be derived after taking expectations on both 
sides of equation (1). In particular, after some simple algebra, the income 
elasticity of each good is found to be: 
TJi- 1 +-
E{wt} 
where the population moment can be estimated by its sample moment. Li-
kewise, the uncompensated price elasticities can be shown to be: 
where Slj3 Kronecker's delta, equals one when the subscripts coincide, and 
it is zero otherwise. 
Using the last two equations, table 3 presents the estimated income and 
own-price elasticities. As can be appreciated from there, our results suggest 
that, out of the four composite goods, non-processed food and medicines 
can be considered as necessities, while processed food and clothing, as well 
as alcoholic beverages and tobacco, can be considered as luxuries. Another 
8 As mentioned earlier, our sample consists of data for 12,696 households. Note that, 
merely for computational reasons, we did not use the expansion factors given in the survey to 
enlarge the sample to represent all the Mexican households. In a social welfare exercise given 
in the next section we do use such factors. TAX REFORM IN MEXICO  67 
plausible result that is implied by table 3 is that the composite good made 
by alcoholic beverages and tobacco is more price-inelastic than the rest. 
Finally, note that the above expressions for the income and price elasticities 
are exact. By using the nonlinear AID system from the beginning, we can 
thus avoid the ad-hoc corrections to the elasticities necessary in the case of 
the linear AID model (a hopeless task, as shown by Buse, 1994). 
4. Welfare impacts of the tax reform 
Having estimated the demand system, we now proceed to assess the welfa-
re impact of the Mexican indirect tax reform described in section 2. Alt-
hough there are several empirical approaches available in the literature to 
accomplish that end (see Slesnick, 1998, for a good review), here we fo-
llow the orthodox methodology, first laid down by King (1983), which has 
become the norm for almost all studies on the subject. 
Estimated elasticities  IStlClti 
Income Elasticities  e2  <?3  e4 
0.891  1.068  1.042  0.877 
Own-Price Elasticities  e\\  e22  «33  e44 
-0.717  -0.921  -0.367  -0.849 
The key steps of what follows revolve around the so-called equivalent 
income function, which plays the role of a monetary measure of the house-
holds welfare. More precisely, for a given household h (= \,...H), let v(p,y) 
denote the indirect utility function derived from a vector of prices p and an 
income y. Under a reference price vector p
R, and given the budget cons-
traint determined by any (p, y), the equivalent income, denoted in what fo-
llows by yE, is defined as the income required to attain the same utility 
level under the reference price vector. Thus, it is implicitly defined as: 
v(p
R,yE) = v(p,y) 
or, using the expenditure function, it is explicitly given by: 68 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
yE = e(p
R, v(p,y)) 
Since the nonlinear AID system is originally derived through the ex-
penditure function, it is not difficult to show that in our case the correspon-
ding equivalent income function is given by:
9 
log yE = log P
R + ft ipf/pjf' log(y/P) (7) 
where P
R and P are the price levels corresponding to the vectors of prices 
p
R and p faced by the household. It should be noted in passing that equa-
tion (7) implicitly assumes that, as it is done here but not in the vast majo-
rity of the papers on the subject, the AID system has been estimated using 
its nonlinear version. 
Turning to the specific problem on hand, let p* be the vector of final 
prices, faced by each household, given the VAT rates and excise taxes that 
prevailed before the tax reform (see again table 1). Also, let 7* be the hou-
sehold's income (which, it should be recalled, is proxied here by total ex-
penditures). Furthermore, let p" be the vector of final prices after the tax 
reform, and let y° be the corresponding income. For each household, the 
welfare change arising from the tax reform can be then estimated, among 




which is the difference between the equivalent income after the tax reform, 
calculated using pre-reform prices as the reference prices, and the income 
before the reform (since, given the reference prices, it is also the pre-re-
form equivalent income). 
Using the results in table 3, we now proceed to estimate, using (8), the 
welfare impact of the tax changes for each of the households. It should 
noted that, since the reform considered here is not revenue neutral, ob-
viously all households lost after the increase in the indirect tax rates descri-
bed in table 1. The interesting question, however, is which income groups 
lost most after the reform. Table 4 answers this question by shoeing the 
distribution by deciles of the equivalent losses arising from the /increase in 
the indirect tax rates. As can be seen there, the losses are the highest for the 
9 This follows from King (1983, p. 210), after correcting an obvious misprint in that 
paper. TAX REFORM IN MEXICO  69 
upper-income groups. This is a plausible result, given that the tax reform 
left untouched most of the basic commodities. 
Table 4 

















3  151.92  4.25  2.80 
4  213.79  6.20  2.90 
5  285.79  8.52  2.98 
6  372.08  11.36  3.05 
7  486.90  15.18  3.12 
8  658.97  20.98  3.18 
9  940.29  30.88  3.28 
10  2078.77  72.15  3.47 
Note: "Income" corresponds here to total expenditures on the composite goods. 
As a complement to those estimations, we can also try to address the 
welfare effects of the tax reform from a social point of view. Following At-
kinson (1970), and most of the subsequent literature on the subject, this can 
be achieved by means of an indirect social welfare function that depends 




cular, we posit a function of the form: 
W(yu-,yH) = l TV 
h=l
 1 P 
In this equation, an increase in the aversion to social inequality is cap-
tured by increasing the parameter ju (note that the function becomes a sum 
of natural logs when fi = 1). Furthermore, the expansion factors of the sur-
vey ENIGH can be used to account for all Mexican households. 
1
0
 As stressed by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1996), among others, the use of this indi-
rect welfare function can be only considered as a rough approximation. See Urziia (2000b) for 
an example, in a different context, of the use of truly Bergsonian welfare functions. 70  ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Following Atkinson, let us now define the equally distributed level of 
equivalent income as the one that would produce, if shared equally, the 
same social welfare level as obtained by the actual distribution of equiva-
lent income: 
W{yE,...,~yE)=W(ym,...,yEH). 
Having calculated that number, we can then define the index of ine-
quality as: 
H 
IN=\ - % lyE, where yE = £ ^ yEh /H. 
This index can be computed before and after the reform, taking care to 
use the same reference prices across households when calculating equiva-
lent incomes. Since in our case there is price variability, we take as referen-
ce prices the means across households. 
It should be noted that such an index, by itself, is not very informative, 
since it does not take into account the direct impact of the reform on inco-
mes. In order to have an overall measure, we follow King (1983) in defi-
ning the proportionate social gain (or loss) from the tax reform as: 
X=yE\\-lN*)lyE
b(\-IN>>) 
In words, the proportionate social change takes into account the varia-
tion in mean equivalent income, after adjusting for the change in inequa-
lity. The results thus obtained are presented in table 5. Since an increase in 
the parameter fi represents an increase in the aversion toward social ine-
quality, the results in that table suggest that the tax reform caused lower 
social losses the higher the inequality aversion is for the Mexican society 
as a whole. 
Table 5 
Proportionate social losses 
Parameter of Proportionate 
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5. Possible extensions to the model 
Aside from the potential extensions already commented on in this the paper, 
many other improvements can be made to this study. To start with, one has to 
contrast the results obtained here with the ones that would result from the in-
clusion of more variables, such as socio-demographic controls, or goods that 
are more disaggregated (e.g., as noted earlier, tobacco and alcoholic bevera-
ges). Another interesting avenue for further research is to use richer models, 
such as the system that allow for quadratic Engel curves proposed by Banks, 
Blundell and Lewbel (1997). Also, simpler models, such as the linear-ex-
penditure system, can take into account the consumption of goods that don't 
exhibit cross-sectional variation in prices (such as gasoline), and have the ad-
ded advantage of being very easy to estimate. Another alternative would be 
to estimate the demand system for different income groups, since one can sur-
mise that the fits may vary as the mean income is changed. 
In our judgment, however, the most important extension would consist 
on the inclusion, in this type of empirical framework, of the production 
sector. Although there have been attempts to do so in the literature (the pio-
neer work along that vein is Jorgenson and Slesnick, 1985), all of them are 
based on the simultaneous use of econometric systems and applied general 
equilibrium models, two techniques that, in our view, don't mix well. 
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